U.S. Action Against Libya Is Nothing Without Allies

BONN — Americans are confronted with the origins of U.S.-Libyan relations every time we hear the Marine Corps Hymn--”to the shores of Tripoli.” Yet it is a great distance from Thomas Jefferson’s disciplining of the Barbary pirates to the exchange of epithets between President Reagan and Col. Moammar Kadafi. The contrast symbolizes changes both in the world and in the nature of demands on U.S. power and purpose.

Once the United States put the finger on Kadafi for his complicity in the terrorist attacks at the Rome and Vienna airports, something had to be done. The economic sanctions that the President ordered Tuesday are something, and a safe something. But cutting off the United States’ modest intercourse with Libya is closer to nothing if other parties that traffic with the truant do not follow suit.

The morning after the President’s announcement, the acting U.S. representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization set forth to “lay it on” the allies. So far, tepid would be too strong a word to describe their response. For example, expressing “relative surprise” at not being consulted, West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said Thursday that he would not support the sanctions.

Yet there is risk in inferring that the Europeans care less about terrorism than does the United States. This can hardly be true for societies that have endured the Red Brigades, Baader-Meinhof and the Provisional IRA. Nor, despite their economic ties with Libya, are all Europeans mesmerized by the chance to make a buck from consorting with Kadafi.

Our difficulties in gaining allied support for dealing with Libya largely stem from the Europeans’ more political approach to power and problems. Put simply, there is a widespread belief on the Continent that terrorists gain strength from conflicts that lack political resolution--most important, the Arab-Israeli conflict.

In 1980 the European Community declared support for self-determination in Gaza and the West Bank, and endorsed a direct role in diplomacy for the Palestine Liberation Organization. Both positions were a rebuff to American peacemaking efforts and anathema to Israel--and both remain a matter of community policy.

This departure from U.S. views derives only in part from the Europeans’ lack of responsibility for making diplomacy work. There is also a common European view that, because of domestic political pressures, the United States frequently mistakes its interests in the Middle East.

The European apostasy, right or wrong, might matter little if the United States were able to sustain its broader Middle East policies on its own. Yet the confrontation with Libya, and with terrorism in general, argues that it cannot. The United States now finds itself, along with Israel, to be remarkably isolated on the Libyan question. Not only are the Europeans reticent, but even Egypt, which has its own troubles with Libya, has joined the Arab League in condemning in advance any U.S. military move against Kadafi.

Diplomatic isolation abroad may not matter at home, where creating the appearance of decisive action against terrorism is the key political requirement. But it does limit our options in the Middle East, weakens the basis for U.S. leadership in peacemaking and further erodes our credibility, especially with moderate Arab states. In effect, we and Israel risk becoming one another’s alter egos. We may be allies (even if without benefit of treaty), but such a close embrace narrows the options of both and fully meets the interests of neither.

The Israeli government appears to understand this point. Thus it said last weekend that the United States should not expect Jerusalem to take on the burden of punishing Libya. For years many Israelis have sought to narrow U.S. options, as in attempts to limit friendship with Egypt and other moderate Arab states. But Israel is not prepared to assume the role and obligations of being America’s only friend in this strategically important area. In the final analysis, we are on our own.

The goal of most terrorism is political change. The major result of the latest brutalities has been to demonstrate the degree to which the United States has been unable to promote changes that will serve the goal of peace in the Middle East. Only by becoming deeply engaged in the peace process (even at the cost of Israeli sensibilities in the short term), only by hammering together a basis for enduring relations between Israel and moderate Arab states, only then will the United States be able to dismantle the political platform of terrorism.